A commentary of William Dembski's

Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/001.html ID-Commentary: "Explaining Specified Complexity" From: Morgan Grey < cynical_prophet@yahoo.com > To: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Reply-to: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Date: Sun Sep 16, 2001 8:36 pm Message: 21453 Subject: ID-Commentary: "Explaining Specified Complexity" This is my first of what I hope to be many weekly posts, in which I post a document by one of the leaders of the ID-movement, together with my comments on it. I hope this feature will spark increased discussion in the group, and, in particular, that any lurking IDers will see this as an oppurtunity to argue the validity of ID. My first such commentary will be on Dembski's "Explaining Specified Complexity", posted on Metanexus at < http://www.metanexus.org/archives/message_fs.asp?&listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=3066 >, and reproduced at < http://www.leaderu.com/offices/dembski/docs/bd-specified.html > [also online here ]. Although I have already made a few comments about this article ([ online here ]), I feel that it still contain some material, and also since I've read all of Dembski's TDI since then, thereby having clearified some misunderstandings on my own part about what Dembski is saying. (Note: The Meta is badly formated, and contains all kind of annoying "=20"'s, which I've removed. If anyone doubt my integrity in reproducing the text, they are welcome to refer back to the original.) ------------------------------------------------------- Meta 139: Dembski on "Explaining Specified Complexity" < grassie@VOICENET.COM > William Grassie Meta 139. 1999/09/13. Approximately 1883 words. BG> Below is a column entitled "Explaining Specified BG> Complexity" by William Dembski at Baylor BG> University in Texas. Dembski discusses whether BG> evolutionary algorithms can generate BG> actual "specified complexity" in nature, as BG> opposed to merely the appearances thereof (i.e., BG> unspecified or randomly generated complexity). BG> Dembski believes these problems in probability BG> make plausible a concept of intelligence involved BG> in evolution. Your comments are welcome on BG> < reiterations@meta-list.org >. BG> BG> -- Billy Grassie BG> WAD> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- EXPLAINING WAD> SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY WAD> WAD> William A. Dembski WAD> WAD> Michael Polanyi Center Baylor University Waco, WAD> Texas 76798 Dembski has a long record of claiming that "[a]lgorithms and natural laws are in principle incapable of explaining the origin of information" (see for example "Intelligent Design", pp. 160), and in a response to a review of "The Design Inference", he directs readers to two Meta-posts, claiming that these would show "that the Darwinian mechanism -and indeed any non-telic mechanism- is incapable of generating specified complexity" (see < http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_responsetowiscu.htm >). He identifies these two posts as "Explaining Specified Complexity" and "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Explain Specified Complexity", and it will be interesting to see if "Explaining Specified Complexity" or "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Explain Specified Complexity" (which I'll be commenting on next week) really do contain the scathing critique that Dembski claims they do. WAD> In his recent book The Fifth Miracle, Paul Davies WAD> suggests that any laws capable of explaining the WAD> origin of life must be radically different from WAD> scientific laws known to date. The problem, as he WAD> sees it, with currently known scientific laws, WAD> like the laws of chemistry and physics, is that WAD> they are not up to explaining the key feature of WAD> life that needs to be explained. That feature is WAD> specified complexity. Life is both complex and WAD> specified. The basic intuition here is WAD> straightforward. A single letter of the alphabet WAD> is specified without being complex (i.e., it WAD> conforms to an independently given pattern but is WAD> simple). A long sequence of random letters is WAD> complex without being specified (i.e., it WAD> requires a complicated instruction-set to WAD> characterize but conforms to no independently WAD> given pattern). A Shakespearean sonnet is both WAD> complex and specified. Notice Dembski's use of "specified complexity" as well as his claim that "[l]ife is both complex and specified" and that seeing this is "straightforward". About a week ago, when I had started reading TDI, I thought that the only difference between it and Dembski's popular writings was that TDI couldn't detect agency ([ online here ]), a thing I already knew from Wesley Elsberry's excellent posts. However, after having read the rest of TDI, as well as other critiques of it, I have noticed several other inconsistencies in Dembski's representation of his explantory filter. Take "specified complexity". While this term is nowhere to be found in TDI, Dembski often claims that the presence of this is a reliable indicator of design (intelligent or not). And, as Dembski claims above, "specified complexity" really *is* "straightforward" to recognize. All one need to do is to check whether the feature in question "conforms to an independently given pattern" and if it "requires a complicated instruction-set to characterize". Of course, given this, few people would object that a DNA molecule contains "specified complexity". Contrast this with Dembski's treatment of design in TDI. To "make a successful design inference" regarding an event E, one needs to calculate the propability of E, with regard to *all* "relevant chance hypotheses" (see pp. 50-1 in TDI), as well as determining that E is specified. This is of course a huge operation, not at all as simple as recognizing "specified complexity", as it is advocated by Dembski above. Indeed, in all of TDI, there is not a *single* example of Dembski applying his explanatory filter to anything, let alone a DNA molecule. Not even in his discussions of Caputo does he regard any other chance hypothesis than "Caputo using an urn model with two balls, one ball for each party". In TDI, Dembski implores us to "Do the propability calculation!" Yet, nowhere in any of his writings has he actually *done* the calculation. Instead, in poular writings, he points to the fact that the DNA molecule contains "specified complexity" without at any time informing his readers that this doesn't mean that his explanatory filter would label it "design". This is, IMHO, a far graver inconsistency than his muddlement of design and agency. [...] WAD> I submit that the problem of explaining specified WAD> complexity is even worse than Davies makes out in WAD> The Fifth Miracle. Not only have we yet to WAD> explain specified complexity at the origin of WAD> life, but evolutionary algorithms fail to explain WAD> it in the subsequent history of life as well. WAD> Given the growing popularity of evolutionary WAD> algorithms, such a claim may seem ill-conceived. WAD> But consider a well known example by Richard WAD> Dawkins (The Blind Watchmaker, pp. 47-48) in WAD> which he purports to show how a cumulative WAD> selection process acting on chance can generate WAD> specified complexity. Dembski has promised us to show that natural selection is *in principle* incabable of creating specified information. Yet, when push comes to show, he's only going to look at a particular evolutionary algorithm, namely Dawkins' famous "Weasel applet", that, in Dawkins' own words, was "misleading in important ways": "Although the monkey/Shakespeare model is useful for explaining the distinction between single-step selection and cumulative selection, it is misleading in important ways. One of these is that each generation of selective "breeding", the mutant "progeny" phrases were judged according to the criterion of resemblance to a *distant ideal* target, the phrase METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL. Life isn't like that. Evolution has no long-term goal. There is no long-distance target, no final perfection to serve as a criterion for selection, although human vanity cherishes the absurd notion that our species is the final goal of evolution." (Dawkins, R., 1996, "The Blind Watchmaker", pp. 50, original emphasis) In other words, Dembski has simply chosen a "misleading", albeit popular, version of natural selection, instead of dealing with the *real* models used by researchers in evolutionary algorithms. For example, Dembski could have chosen to deal with how an evolutionary algorithm solves the "500 city Traveling Salesman Problem", like Wesley has asked him to do for years ([ online here ]). WAD> He starts with the following target sequence, a WAD> putative instance of specified complexity: WAD> WAD> METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL Dembski's use of "putative" indicates that Dembski thinks that METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL really isn't an instance of specified complexity. However, after having followed Dembski's (often confusing) advice on how to calculate specified complexity, I have reached the conclusion that METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL really *is* an instance of "specified complexity". Anyone interested in the calculations as well as the reasons for them can consult the not-so-technical appendix. But since, as we have seen, "specified complexity" is *not* the same as "design", it is still a possibility that METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL will not be labelled "design" by the explanatory filter. WAD> (he considers only capital Roman letters and WAD> spaces, here represented by bullets-thus 27 WAD> possibilities at each location in a symbol WAD> string). WAD> WAD> If we tried to attain this target sequence by WAD> pure chance (for example, by randomly shaking out WAD> scrabble pieces), the probability of getting it WAD> on the first try would be around 10 to the -40, WAD> and correspondingly it would take on average WAD> about 10 to the 40 tries to stand a better than WAD> even chance of getting it. Thus, if we depended WAD> on pure chance to attain this target sequence, we WAD> would in all likelihood be unsuccessful. As a WAD> problem for pure chance, attaining Dawkins's WAD> target sequence is an exercise in generating WAD> specified complexity, and it becomes clear that WAD> pure chance simply is not up to the task. I consider it interesting that while the propability of the sequence is considerably lower than Dembski's own bound of 500 bits (see the appendix), he still thinks that "pure chance simply is not up to the task" of generating it. This indicates that not even Dembski takes his probability bound serious. WAD> But consider next Dawkins's reframing of the WAD> problem. In place of pure chance, he considers WAD> the following evolutionary algorithm: (i) Start WAD> out with a randomly selected sequence of 28 WAD> capital Roman letters and spaces, e.g., WAD> WAD> WDL*MNLT*DTJBKWIRZREZLMQCO*P WAD> WAD> (note that the length of Dawkins's target WAD> sequence, METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL, comprises WAD> exactly 28 letters and spaces); (ii) randomly WAD> alter all the letters and spaces in this initial WAD> randomly-generated sequence; (iii) whenever an WAD> alteration happens to match a corresponding WAD> letter in the target sequence, leave it and WAD> randomly alter only those remaining letters that WAD> still differ from the target sequence. This is a complete misrepresentation of Dawkins' "Weasel applet". I refuse to believe that anyone who has read "The Blind Watchmaker" can write the above. The "Weasel applet" does *not* "randomly alter all the letters and spaces", and since it has no way of knowing which alterations "happens to match a corresponding letter in the target sequence", there is no way it can "leave it and randomly alter only those remaining letters that still differ from the target sequence." Dawkins' "Weasel applet" "breeds" a number of "progeny", in every case randomly changing *some* of the letters, then seeing what "progeny" has the closest *overall* match with the target sequence. As though the "Weasel applet" wasn't misleading enough, Dembski has made it even more so, making it in no way a representive of the process (natural selection) he's criticizing. WAD> In very short order this algorithm converges to WAD> Dawkins's target sequence. In The Blind WAD> Watchmaker, Dawkins (p. 48) provides the WAD> following computer simulation of this algorithm: WAD> WAD> (1)WDL*MNLT*DTJBKWIRZREZLMQCO*P WAD> WAD> (2)WDLTMNLT*DTJBSWIRZREZLMQCO*P WAD> ... WAD> (10) MDLDMNLS*ITJISWHRZREZ*MECS*P WAD> ... WAD> (20) MELDINLS*IT*ISWPRKE*Z*WECSEL WAD> ... WAD> (30) METHINGS*IT*ISWLIKE*B*WECSEL WAD> ... WAD> (40) METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*I*WEASEL WAD> ... WAD> (43) METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL WAD> WAD> Thus, Dawkins's simulation converges on the WAD> target sequence in 43 steps. In place of 10 to WAD> the 40 tries on average for pure chance to WAD> generate the target sequence, it now takes on WAD> average only 40 tries to generate it via an WAD> evolutionary algorithm. WAD> WAD> Although Dawkins uses this example to illustrate WAD> the power of evolutionary algorithms, the example WAD> in fact illustrates the inability of evolutionary WAD> algorithms to generate specified complexity. We WAD> can see this by posing the following question: WAD> Given Dawkins's evolutionary algorithm, what WAD> besides the target sequence can this algorithm WAD> attain? This is nothing but a red herring. Nowhere in TDI, as well as in any of his popular writings, has Dembski identified "ability to attain anything besides the target sequence" as a requirement of having specified complexity. And if this criterion was applied to humans doing things as well, it is doubtful how much of what we do could be considered exhibiting "specified complexity". If by "target sequence" Dembski means "what one set one's mind to doing before doing it", it would only be people with nerve or brain damages, being unable to do what they wanted, who could be considered producers of specified complexity. WAD> Think of it this way. Dawkins's evolutionary WAD> algorithm is chugging along; what are the WAD> possible terminal points of this algorithm? WAD> Clearly, the algorithm is always going to WAD> converge on the target sequence (with WAD> probability 1 for that matter). An evolutionary WAD> algorithm acts as a probability amplifier. WAD> Whereas it would take pure chance on average 10 WAD> to the 40 tries to attain Dawkins's target WAD> sequence, his evolutionary algorithm on average WAD> gets it for you in the logarithm of that number, WAD> that is, on average in only 40 tries (and with WAD> virtual certainty in a few hundred tries). WAD> WAD> But a probability amplifier is also a complexity WAD> attenuator. For something to be complex, there WAD> must be many live possibilities that could take WAD> its place. Notice Dembski's terminological sleight-of-hand here. First, he determines that the sequence indeed *does* contatin "specified complexity". Then, he conflates "specified complexity" with "design" (which, as we have seen, there is no basis for doing). And finally, he submits it to the explanatory filter, which labels it "regularity", since it is a high-propability event (see Section 2.1 of TDI). This, of course, leads to a contradiction, since specified complexity is *not* "design". Therefore, Dembski must now forget what he initially claimed, namely, that the sequence exhibits specified complexity. How this is done will become "appearant"... [...] WAD> It follows that Dawkins's evolutionary algorithm, WAD> by vastly increasing the probability of getting WAD> the target sequence, vastly decreases the WAD> complexity inherent in that sequence. As the sole WAD> possibility that Dawkins's evolutionary algorithm WAD> can attain, the target sequence in fact has WAD> minimal complexity (i.e., the probability is 1 WAD> and the complexity, as measured by the usual WAD> information measure, is 0). In general, then, WAD> evolutionary algorithms generate not true WAD> complexity but only the appearance of complexity. WAD> And since they cannot generate complexity, they WAD> cannot generate specified complexity either. Now, we also have "appearant" and "actual specified complexity", where "appearant specified complexity" is anything produced by an evolutionary algorithm, while "actual specified complexity" is that produced by intelligent agents. But since "specified complexity" is supposed to be what divides the product of intelligence from that of other processes, the only way we can determine if the sequence METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL is produced by an evolutionary algorithm is to see... if it was made by an evolutionary algorithm. WAD> This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, WAD> especially given all the marvelous properties WAD> that evolutionary algorithms do possess. But the WAD> conclusion holds. What's more, it is consistent WAD> with the "no free lunch" (NFL) theorems of David WAD> Wolpert and William Macready, which place WAD> significant restrictions on the range of problems WAD> genetic algorithms can solve. According to Wesley, Dembski has seriously distorted Wolpert and Macready's "No Free Lunch" theorems: "NFL says that when you average the performance of an algorithm over all "cost functions" of a problem, it performs no better on average than blind search. That is for *any* algorithm, not just evolutionary computation (which Dembski likes to imply). This goes to early claims that certain forms of evolutionary computation could be considered as general problem-solvers that could be deployed without much domain knowledge of a problem. NFL says that if you are concerned about the relative efficiency of getting a solution, you have to apply domain knowledge of the problem and cost function to select an algorithm with good performance on that problem and cost function. NFL isn't about essential capacity of an algorithm to produce a solution; it is about comparative efficiency of algorithms in producing solutions. It's my opinion that Dembski misconstrues or misunderstands what the NFL theorems say. I've passed word along that Dembski's choice of "No Free Lunch" for the title of a book that is due out this fall sets him up for embarrassment. That's still the title, so far as I know. It will be interesting to see how the reviews turn out. The introduction to the book is online at ." (Wesley R. Elsberry, [ online here ]) WAD> The claim that evolutionary algorithms can only WAD> generate the appearance of specified complexity WAD> is reminiscent of a claim by Richard Dawkins. On WAD> the opening page of his The Blind Watchmaker he WAD> states, "Biology is the study of complicated WAD> things that give the appearance of having been WAD> designed for a purpose." Just as the Darwinian WAD> mechanism does not generate actual design but WAD> only its appearance, so too the Darwinian WAD> mechanism does not generate actual specified WAD> complexity but only its appearance. WAD> WAD> But this raises the obvious question, whether WAD> there might not be a fundamental connection WAD> between intelligence or design on the one hand WAD> and specified complexity on the other. In fact WAD> there is. There's only one known source for WAD> producing actual specified complexity, and that's WAD> intelligence. Of course, if "actual specified complexity" is defined as "that specified complexity that is produced by intelligence", then the above is *obvious*. But then the claim "life contains actual specified complexity" becomes false, since we do *not* know that life was produced by intelligence. Indeed, that is what Dembski's filter is supposed to demonstrate in the first place. WAD> In every case where we know the causal history WAD> responsible for an instance of specified WAD> complexity, an intelligent agent was involved. Of course, if you a priori eliminate all instances of non-intelligent processes producing specified complexity, then you would hardly be surprised in finding that "[i]n every case where we know the causal history responsible for an instance


A commentary on William Dembski's

Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/002.html ID-Commentary: "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Generate Specified Complexity" From: "Morgan Grey" < cynical_prophet@yahoo.com > To: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Reply-to: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2001 15:00:15 -0700 (PDT) Message: 21796 Subject: [DebunkCreation] ID-Commentary: "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Generate Specified Complexity" I appologize for the long delay in posting this, but the last couple of weeks have been rather hectic. This is my second commentary on ID-texts. This week, I'm commenting on Dembski's "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Generate Specified Complexity", Dembski's second post on why evolutionary algorithms can't explain specified complexity, from < http://www.metanexus.org/archives/message_fs.asp?&listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=3080 > (also online at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/3080.html >). My last such post can be found at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/001.html >. Again, note that the original Metaview contains some =20's and a few =9's, which I have removed. And again, readers are invited to check for themselves if I have correctly conveyed the original message by doing so. ------------------------------------------------------- Metaviews 152: "Specified Complexity" by William Dembski grassie@VOICENET.COM William Grassie Metaviews 152. 1999/11/1. Approximately 3575 words. BG> Below is another posting from William Dembski at BG> Baylor University in Waco, TX. Dembski BG> continues his discussion of evolutionary BG> algorithms (see Meta 139) and presents a BG> mathematical argument for why such algorithms BG> cannot generate specified complexity Dembski does no such thing. The points of critique launched in this essay are limited to: 1) Evolutionary algorithms always solve their problems, setting the probability of success at 1, and the complexity therefore at 0. 2) Evolutionary algorithms get their "specified complexity" from the fitness functions, and thus have not *created* it. None of these are supported by any kind of "mathematics", unless one considers any essay with numbers in it to be "mathematical". BG> as asserted by Richard Dawkins. Dembski here continues the practice I also critiqued in my previous installment of ID-Commentary: Namely, to only criticize Dawkins' "misleading" Weasel program, instead of dealing with *real* problems solved by evolutionary algorithms, as asked by critics of Dembski. This is especially suspect, since "Why Evolutionary Algorithms Cannot Generate Specified Complexity" (and its companion-piece "Explaining Specified Complexity") is being presented as an *in principle*-refutation of the possibility of evolutionary algorithms producing "specified complexity". When speaking to the general public, who only know Dawkins' Weasel program, this tactic might work very well, but leave more informed skeptics wondering why Dembski keeps avoiding the *real* challenges, if his "explanatory filter" really is capable of doing what has been attributed to it. BG> A number of equations are presented in the BG> appendix. BG> BG> Dembski concludes that "all the specified BG> complexity we get out of an evolutionary algorithm BG> has first to be put into the construction of the BG> evolutionary algorithm and into the fitness BG> function that guides the algorithm. Evolutionary BG> algorithms therefore do not generate or create BG> specified complexity, but merely harness already BG> existing specified complexity." I am not sure I BG> follow the entire argument, Bill Grassie's confusion is understandable, since Dembski has a wonderful ability to cloak everything he says in a highly techincal and intimidating babble. Therefore, most of my comments will deal with what Dembski is actually *saying*, trying to "translate" his impressive-sounding lingo, showing that it often covers simple and uncontroversial statements. BG> but I am certainly reminded of my first BG> programming course as a freshman in college in BG> 1975, when I clocked 70 hours one week in the lab BG> trying to code a quick sort algorithm. Some more BG> teleological interventions would have helped. BG> BG> I will entertain responses on the Metaviews list BG> and try to run some compilation in a week or so. BG> If you want immediate gratification conversation, BG> check out the Reiterations List at for a higher BG> volume, lightly moderated discussion. BG> BG> -- Billy Grassie BG> WAD> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- WAD> =-=-= From: bill@desiderius.com (William A. WAD> Dembski) Subject: Specified Complexity WAD> WAD> WHY EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS CANNOT GENERATE WAD> SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY by William A. Dembski WAD> WAD> In my last piece for META, I asserted that WAD> evolutionary algorithms cannot generate specified WAD> complexity and motivated this assertion by WAD> pointing to the failure of Richard Dawkins's well- WAD> known METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL example to WAD> generate specified complexity. My point was that WAD> Dawkins's evolutionary algorithm converged on WAD> METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL with probability WAD> one, and therefore reduced the complexity of WAD> generating this sequence to zero. With reference WAD> to specified complexity, complexity and WAD> probability are inverse notions: High complexity WAD> presupposes many live possibilities and WAD> correspondingly assigns low probability to anyone WAD> of these possibilities. Thus, while it's true WAD> that shaking out random scrabble pieces would WAD> render METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL highly WAD> improbable (and therefore complex), Dawkins's WAD> evolutionary algorithm renders that sequence WAD> certain and thereby removes its complexity. WAD> WAD> Basically, the problem here is one of setting the WAD> relevant probabilistic context. Within a random- WAD> scrabble-shaking-scenario, this sequence is WAD> complex and specified, but within Dawkins's WAD> evolutionary algorithm it is no longer complex WAD> (though it remains specified). I therefore WAD> concluded my last piece by saying that just as WAD> Darwinian evolution only delivers the WAD> **appearance** of design (an assertion all WAD> Darwinists perforce accept), so too it only WAD> delivers the **appearance** of specified WAD> complexity. Dembski forgets the other half of his conlusion: That his actual/appearant split of "specified complexity" makes it considerably more difficult to determine whether life indeed *is* an instance of specified complexity: "Does nature exhibit actual specified complexity? The jury is still out." (Dembski, W.A., 1999, in Meta #3066) [...] WAD> In general terms, the problem of generating WAD> specified complexity via an evolutionary WAD> algorithm can be conceived as follows. We are WAD> given a phase space of possible solutions to a WAD> problem and a fitness function over that phase WAD> space. Our task is to optimize this fitness WAD> function by finding a point in the phase space WAD> that attains a certain level of fitness. Think of WAD> it this way: The phase space is a vast plane, the WAD> fitness function is a vast hollowed-out mountain- WAD> range over the plane (complete with low-lying WAD> foothills and incredibly high peaks). The task of WAD> an evolutionary algorithm is by moving around in WAD> the plane to get to some point under the mountain- WAD> range where it attains at least a certain height WAD> (e.g., 10,000 feet). The collection of all such WAD> places on the plane where the mountain range WAD> attains at least that height (here 10,000 feet) WAD> we will call the **target**. Thus the job of the WAD> evolutionary algorithm is by navigating the phase WAD> space to find its way into the target (see WAD> Appendix 1 below). What Dembski here calls the "phase space" is already known to readers of Dawkins as "genetic space": "Imagine a museum with gallaries stretching towards the horizon in every direction, and as far as the eye can see upwards and downwards as well. Preserved in the museum is every kind of animal form that has ever existed, and every kind that could be imagined. Each animal is housed next door to those it most resembles. Each dimension in the museum -that is, each dimension along which a gallary extends- corresponds to one dimension in which the animals vary. For example, as you walk north along a particular gallary you notice a progressive lengthening of the horns of the speciments in the cabinets. Turn round and walk south and the horns shorten. Turn and walk east and that horns stay the same but something else changes, say the teeth get sharper. Walk west and the teeth grow blunter. Since horn length and teeth sharpness are only two out of thousands of ways in which animals can vary, the gallaries must criss-cross one another in many-dimensional space, not just the ordinary three-dimensional space that we, with our limited minds, are capable of visualizing." (Dawkins, R., 1996, "Climbing Mount Improbable", pp. 200) In the case of Dawkins' weasel program, the "phase space" is 28-dimensional (since there are 28 positions that can vary), where each dimension is 27 characters long (since there are 26 letters + space). In the weasel program, the algorithm can move any numbers of characters, but is restricted to moving a certain number of dimensions at a time (kinda' like the tower in chess, which can only move either back-forth or left-right, but can move any number of spaces). WAD> Now, the phase space (which we are picturing as a WAD> giant plane) usually comes with some additional WAD> topological structure, typically given by a WAD> metric or distance function (see Appendix 2). WAD> This topological structure tells us how points in WAD> the phase space are related geometrically to WAD> nearby points. The concept Dembski is trying to convey is that known to the biological community as a "fitness landscape", where increasing altitude stands for increasing fitness, as defined in terms of reproductive sucess. In the case of Dawkins' weasel program, the fitness landscape is a 29-dimensional cone, placed "over" the 28-dimensional "chessboard" (a.k.a. "phase space"). On the space directly under the top of the cone, the target sequence ("methinks it is like a weasel") is written, while the spaces around it are labelled with sequences very close to it (e.g. "yethinks it is like a weasel" and "methinks it is like a geasel"). WAD> Also, even though the phase space is huge, it WAD> tends to be finite (strictly finite for problems WAD> represented on computer and topologically finite, WAD> or what topologists call "compact," in general). This is quite uncontroversial. The number of possible 28-letter sequences, each position with 27 possible outcomes (28^27 ~ 10^39) *is* "huge, [but] finite". WAD> Moreover, such spaces typically come with a WAD> uniform probability that is adapted to the WAD> topology of the phase space (see Appendix 3). With respect to Dawkins' weasel program, this pretty much means that the very first sequence has no more probability coming up "jhdhonfybyyeev nzyvqqtiilke" than "xgyhsnszciuhanomqtwlpgwaaumu". I know of no algorithms, where this is not the case. Dembski's reason for mentioning this is unclear. WAD> Basically this means that if you get out your WAD> tape measure and measure off a three by five foot WAD> area in one part of the phase space, the uniform WAD> probability will assign it the same probability WAD> as a three by five foot area in another portion WAD> of the phase space. All the spaces to which I've WAD> seen evolutionary algorithms applied do indeed WAD> satisfy these two conditions of having a finite WAD> topological structure (i.e., they are compact) WAD> and possessing a uniform probability. Moreover, WAD> this uniform probability is what typically gets WAD> used to estimate the complexity/improbability of WAD> the target (i.e., the area of the phase space WAD> under the mountain range where it attains a WAD> certain requisite level -- e.g., 10,000 feet). WAD> WAD> For instance, in Dawkins's WAD> METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL example, the phase WAD> space consists of strings of upper case Roman WAD> letters and spaces (represented by asterisks) of WAD> length 28. A uniform probability on this space WAD> assigns equal probability to each of these WAD> sequences -- approximately 1 in 10^40. It's this WAD> improbability that corresponds to the complexity WAD> of the target sequence and with respect to which WAD> this target sequence constitutes an instance of WAD> specified complexity. Again, Dembski is being very unclear about what *exactly* he means by "specified complexity". Judging from the above, one would think that the "complexity" (i.e. "propability") of a certain event should be calculated only with respect to a single chance hypothesis. But in TDI (pp. 50) Dembski says that his explanatory filter needs to "sweep the field clear of" *all* chance hypotheses. This wouldn't be much of a problem, since "specified complexity" is never even mentioned in TDI. But since Dembski is constantly referring to specified complexity as a characteristic feature of "design", as well as to TDI as his "scholarly argument" for his ideas, this is unlikely to be anything *but* a problem. WAD> In general, given a phase space with a target WAD> sitting under those places where the mountain WAD> range attains at least a certain level (e.g., WAD> 10,000 feet), the (uniform) probability of WAD> randomly choosing a point from the phase space WAD> and landing in the target will be very small. In WAD> Dawkins's example, the target equals the WAD> character string METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL and WAD> the improbability is 1 in 10^40. For non-toy WAD> examples the improbability is typically much less WAD> than my universal probability bound of 1 in WAD> 10^150 that I justify in The Design Inference WAD> (Cambridge, 1998; cf. section 6.5). Indeed, if WAD> the probability of the target were not small, a WAD> random search through the phase space would WAD> suffice to find a point in the target, and there WAD> would be no need to construct an evolutionary WAD> algorithm to find it. Again, few people would disagree that "methinks it is like a weasel" is too long to find just by randomly selecting letters and spaces. Indeed, Dawkins himself concluded that it "would be a long time coming" before this would produce the target sequence ("The Blind Watchmaker", pp. 47). WAD> We therefore suppose that the target is just a WAD> tiny portion of the whole phase space; or, in WAD> slightly more technical language, the (uniform) WAD> probability of the target in relation to the WAD> phase space as a whole is exceedingly small. WAD> What's more, the target, in virtue of its WAD> explicit identification, is specified (certainly WAD> this is the case in Dawkins's example where the WAD> target includes but one point and coincides with WAD> the character string WAD> METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL). Thus it would seem WAD> that to find a point in the target would be to WAD> generate specified complexity. But just as Morris and Whitcomb thinks that radiometric datings only show the "appearent age" of the Earth, so Dembski believes that the solution produced is only "appearant specified complexity". WAD> But let's look deeper. Consider an evolutionary WAD> algorithm that does in fact find the target. An WAD> evolutionary algorithm can be conceived as a WAD> stochastic process that moves around the phase WAD> space some finite number of times (see Appendix WAD> 4). Let's call the evolutionary algorithm E. The WAD> evolutionary algorithm starts at some point E(0) WAD> in the phase space (usually chosen at random). WAD> Then it moves to E(1). Then to E(2). Then to E WAD> (3). Etc. For E successfully to find the target WAD> (i.e., to find a point under the mountain range WAD> where it attains at least a certain level -- WAD> e.g., 10,000 feet) then means that within a WAD> manageable number of steps n, E is very likely to WAD> land in the target -- i.e., some one of E(0), E WAD> (1), ..., E(n) is likely to land in the target WAD> (see Appendix 5). Simply put, the algorithm E has WAD> to get us into the target with high probability WAD> and in a relatively short number of steps. In the WAD> Dawkins example, E(n) rapidly converged to WAD> METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL for n around 40. WAD> WAD> An evolutionary algorithm needs to be contrasted WAD> with pure random sampling. Pure random sampling WAD> treats the phase space as a giant urn from which WAD> we draw items at random according to the uniform WAD> probability. In that case, a random sample from M WAD> of size k will contain a point in the target with WAD> probability better than 1/2 provided that k is WAD> around the reciprocal of the (uniform) WAD> probability of the target. Since we are assuming WAD> that the probability of the target is less than WAD> my universal probability bound of 1 in 10^150 WAD> given earlier, it follows that k will need to be WAD> at least 10^150. This number is enormous and far WAD> exceeds the number of computations conceivable WAD> for any traditional computer. Moreover, it WAD> doesn't seem that quantum computation is going to WAD> render this number tractable either since the WAD> points in phase space need to be made explicit in WAD> any random sampling scheme (implying decoherence WAD> and thus preventing us from exploiting quantum WAD> superposition). Since all of the above is the case, both with respect to Dawkins' weasel program, as well as all examples of evolutionary algorithms that I am aware of, I am puzzled as to why Dembski finds it relevant to mention. WAD> Let's now return to the evolutionary algorithm E. WAD> We're going to allow ourselves a certain number WAD> of steps, call it m, for E to land in the target. WAD> Clearly m is going to have to be much less than WAD> 10^150 if we're going to program E on a computer WAD> and have any hope of E landing in the target. WAD> With m fixed, we can determine the probability WAD> that E will land in any subset of phase space in WAD> m steps (see Appendix 6). For instance, in the WAD> Dawkins example, for m = 100 and the target WAD> sequence METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL and E the WAD> cumulative selection algorithm Dawkins WAD> constructed, the probability of E attaining the WAD> target in m = 100 steps is approximately 1. WAD> WAD> What this means is that even though with respect WAD> to the uniform probability on the phase space the WAD> target has exceedingly small probability, the WAD> probability for the evolutionary algorithm E to WAD> get into the target in m steps is no longer WAD> small. And since complexity and improbability are WAD> for the purposes of specified complexity parallel WAD> notions, this means that even though the target WAD> is complex and specified with respect to the WAD> uniform probability on the phase space, it WAD> remains specified but is no longer complex with WAD> respect to the probability induced by WAD> evolutionary algorithm E. Now Demsbki seems to have returned to claiming that complexity needs to be calculated with regard to *all* relevant chance hypotheses (as opposed to just the "uniform probability"). While few would disagree that life is complex with regard to the chance hypothesis of it being assembled by throwing random molecules together, it is quite another matter if it is complex with regard to it having come about through the actualization of heritable modifications, exclusion of certain modifications through differental reproductive success, and specified through the conditions of the environment (i.e. natural selection). In fact, whether this is so is the very point in question, and IDers are just assuming their conclusion when they claim that life contains "specified complexity". WAD> Does this mean that the evolutionary algorithm WAD> has in fact generated complex specified WAD> information, but that in referring


A commentary of William Dembski's

Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/003.html ID-Commentary: "Another Way to Detect Design?" From: Morgan Grey < cynical_prophet@yahoo.com > To: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Reply-to: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Date: Sun Oct 7, 2001 10:29 pm Message: 21866 Subject: ID-Commentary: "Another Way to Detect Design?" This is my third commentary on ID-texts. This week, I'm commenting on Dembski's "Another Way to Detect Design?", a reply to Fitelson, Stephens & Sober's (FS&S) "How Not to Detect Design" (online at < http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_wisconsinureview.htm >), which I recommend everyone to read. It is a bit technical in passages, but is a sound critique of Dembski's filter. Dembski's reply on Meta-views can be found at < http://www.meta-list.org/archives/fulldetails.asp?listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=3097 > (and is also online at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/3097.html >). My last such post can be found at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/002.html >. ------------------------------------------------------- 167: Detecting Design? by William Dembski Metaviews 167. 1999/12/29. Approximately 2593 words. BR> Below is another column from William Dembski, now BR> at Baylor University's Polanyi Center . In the BR> piece below, Dembski responds to Elliott Sober BR> review in the Philosophy of Science, September BR> 1999. Dembski concludes: BR> BR> "We are back, then, to needing some account of BR> complexity and specification. Thus a likelihood BR> analysis that pits competing design and chance BR> hypotheses against each other must itself BR> presuppose the legitimacy of specified complexity BR> as a reliable empirical marker of intelligence. BR> Consequently, if there is a way to detect design, BR> specified complexity is it." BR> BR> -- Billy Grassie BR> WAD> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- WAD> =-=-= From: William_Dembski@baylor.edu (William WAD> A. Dembski) Subject: Another Way to Detect WAD> Design? WAD> WAD> In The Design Inference (Cambridge, 1998) I argue WAD> that specified complexity is a reliable empirical WAD> marker of intelligent design. Dembski does no such thing. "Specified complexity" is never even *mentioned* in TDI. Only in later writings does Dembski claim that the concept has anything to do with his 1998 dissertation. Furthermore, Dembski's claim that his filter can somehow detect *intelligent* design, is also confined to later, popular writings. In TDI, he writes: "Thus, even though a design inference is frequently the first step toward identifying an intelligent agent, design as inferred from the design inference does not logically entail an intelligent agent. The design that emerges from the design inference must not be conflated with intelligent agency. Though they are frequently linked, the two are seperate. Whether an event conforms to a pattern is a seperate question from what caused an event to conform to a pattern." (pp. 8-9) And this is only the first time Dembski claims this. Other similar attempts to distinguish "design" from. intelligent agency can be found in TDI on pp. 19-20, 36, and 226-7. WAD> A long sequence of random letters is complex WAD> without being specified. Here, Dembski is taking advantage of the fact that to the general lay-reader, "complexity" is something about consisting of many parts, or being difficult to understand: ------------------------------------------------------- (< http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=complex >) [...] complex \Com"plex\, a. [...] 1. Composed of two or more parts; composite; not simple; as, a complex being; a complex idea. [...] 2. Involving many parts; complicated; intricate. [...] Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, © 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc. ------------------------------------------------------- However, Dembski's notion of complexity is far from that of the lay-reader. In chapter 5 in TDI, Dembski argues that "[p]robability measures are disguised complexity measures" (p. 114). Or, as Dembski writes in "Intelligent Design": "It follows, therefore, that how we measure information needs to be independent of whatever procedure we use to individuate the possibilities under consideration. The way to do this is not simply to count possibilities but to assign probabilities to these possibilities." (pp. 154) and "As a purely formal object, the information measure described here is a complexity measure." (pp. 158) To illustrate the difference between the general concept of complexity and the concept as proposed by Dembski, consider an atom with nine electrons in its outer shell. While the average observer would probably refer to this system as "simple", Dembski's complexity measure would label it "complex", due to its low probability of occuring. To the one's who spend their chemistry lessons drawing naked women in their notebooks: Having eight electrons in the outer shell is the "optimal" state of atoms, and every atoms "attemps" to reach this state (except in the first shell, where the optimal number is two). Finding an atom with *nine* electrons in its outer shell would thus be as unlikely as finding two magnets with their positive poles stuck together. But most of Dembski's audience doesn't know this. They think that "[a] long sequence of random letters is complex" because it is long, not because it is improbable. And of course, Dembski never establishes *which* "long sequence[s] of random letters" are improbable, let alone informing his audience that this needs to be determined, letting them stay in blissful ignorance. WAD> A short sequence of letters like "the," "so," WAD> or "a" is specified without being complex. Again, Dembski very conveniently "forgets" to mention that according to his own complexity measure, complexity have nothing to do with the length of the sequence. WAD> A Shakespearean sonnet is both complex and WAD> specified. Thus in general, given an event, WAD> object, or structure, to convince ourselves that WAD> it is designed we need to show that it is WAD> improbable (i.e., complex) and suitably patterned WAD> (i.e., specified). It is only later (and even then, tucked away in parantheses) that Dembski even hints at the connection between propability and complexity. WAD> Not everyone agrees. Elliott Sober, for instance, WAD> holds that specified complexity is exactly the WAD> wrong instrument for detecting design (see his WAD> September 1999 review in Philosophy of Science WAD> titled "How Not to Detect Design"). In this piece WAD> I want to consider the main criticisms of WAD> specified complexity as a reliable empirical WAD> marker of intelligence, show how they fail, and WAD> argue that not only does specified complexity WAD> pinpoint how we detect design, but it is also our WAD> sole means for detecting design. Before evaluating if Dembski succeeds in "consider[ing] the main criticisms of specified complexity", let us see what FS&S's "main criticisms" are. 1) Dembski's filter is much too punctilious, since a design inference can be made with respect to likelihoods of the hypothesis being correct: "There is a straightforward reason for thinking that the observed outcomes favor Design over Chance. If Caputo had allowed his political allegiance to guide his arrangement of ballots, you'd expect Democrats to be listed first on all or almost all of the ballots. ... The key concept is *likelihood*. The likelihood of a hypothesis is the probability it confers on the observations; it is not the probability that the observations confer on the hypothesis. ... Chance and Design can be evaluated by comparing their likelihoods, relative to the same set of observations." (original emphasis) 2) Dembski's terminology and examples are confusing and contradictory: "Dembski defines the Regularity hypothesis in different ways. Sometimes it is said to assert that the evidence E is noncontingent and is reducible to law (39, 53); at other times it is taken to claim that E is a deterministic consequence of earlier conditions (65, 146n5); and at still other times, it is supposed to say that E was highly probable, given some earlier state of the world (38)." "Understanding what "regularity," "chance," and "design" mean in Dembski's framework is made more difficult by some of his examples. Dembski discusses a teacher who finds that the essays submitted by two students are nearly identical (46). One hypothesis is that the students produced their work independently; a second hypothesis asserts that there was plagiarism. Dembski treats the hypothesis of independent origination as a Chance hypothesis and the plagiarism hypothesis as an instance of Design. Yet, both describe the matching papers as issuing from intelligent agency, as Dembski points out (47)." "The same sort of interpretive problem attaches to Dembski's discussion of the Caputo example. We think that all of the following hypotheses appeal to intelligent agency: (i) Caputo decided to spin a roulette wheel on which 00 was labeled "Republican" and the other numbers were labeled "Democrat;" (ii) Caputo decided to toss a fair coin; (iii) Caputo decided to favor his own party. Since all three hypotheses describe the ballot ordering as issuing from intelligent agency, all, apparently, are instances of Design in Dembski's sense. However, Dembski says that they are examples, respectively, of Regularity, Chance, and Design." 3) There is no reason why regularity needs to be rejected before chance can be accepted, or why both need to be rejected before design can be accepted: "In the first example, Dembski (39) says that Newton's hypothesis that the stability of the solar system is due to God's intervention into natural regularities is less parsimonious than Laplace's hypothesis that the stability is due solely to regularity. In the second, he compares the hypothesis that a pair of dice is fair with the hypothesis that each is heavily weighted towards coming up 1. He claims that the latter provides the more parsimonious explanation of why snake-eyes occurred on a single roll. We agree with Dembski's simplicity ordering in the first example; the example illustrates the idea that a hypothesis that postulates two causes R and G is less parsimonious than a hypothesis that postulates R alone. However, this is not an example of Regularity versus Design, but an example of Regularity&Design versus Regularity alone; in fact, it is an example of two causes versus one, and the parsimony ordering has nothing to do with the fact that one of those causes involves design. In Dembski's second example, the hypotheses differ in likelihood, relative to the data cited; however, if parsimony is supposed to be a different consideration from fit-to-data, it is questionable whether these hypotheses differ in parsimony." 5) With respect to chance and regularity, Dembski's filter is likely to make a wrong inference: "The fact that the Filter allows you to accept or reject Regularity without attending to what specific Regularity hypotheses predict has some peculiar consequences. Suppose you have in mind just one specific regularity hypothesis that is a candidate for explaining E; you think that if E has a regularity-style explanation, this has got to be it. If E is a rare type of event, the Filter says to conclude that E is not due to Regularity. This can happen even if the specific hypothesis, when conjoined with initial condition statements, predicts E with perfect precision. Symmetrically, if E is a common kind of event, the Filter says not to reject Regularity, even if your lone specific Regularity hypothesis deductively entails that E is false." 4) Dembski's specification criterion is useless in helping one formulate patterns of specification (as opposed to those of fabrications). One of the conditions offered by Dembski is far too lenient on chance hypotheses, and the two other even allows tautologies to be formulated as specifications: "CINDE [one of the conditions] is too lenient on Chance hypotheses -- it says that their violating CINDE suffices for them to be accepted (or not rejected). Suppose you want to explain why Smith has lung cancer (E). It is part of your background knowledge (I) that he smoked cigarettes for thirty years, but you are considering the hypothesis (H) that Smith read the works of Ayn Rand and that this helped bring about his illness. To investigate this question, you do a statistical study and discover that smokers who read Rand have the same chance of lung cancer as smokers who do not. This study allows you to draw a conclusion about Smith -- that Pr(E | H&I) = Pr (E | not-H &I). Surely this equality is evidence against the claim that E is due to H. However, the filter says that you can't reject the causal claim, because CINDE is false -- Pr (E | H&I) [is not equal to] Pr(E | H)." "In fact, just writing down a tautology satisfies TRACT and DELIM (165). On the assumption that human beings are able to write down tautologies, we conclude that these two conditions are always satisfied and so play no substantive role in the Filter." 5) Dembski is wrong in claiming that one should reject speciefied events of small probability to avoid a "probabilistic inconsistency": "Suppose you know that an urn contains either 10% green balls or 1% green balls; perhaps you saw the urn being filled from one of two buckets (you don't know which), whose contents you examined. Suppose you draw 10 balls from the urn and find that 7 are green. From a likelihood point of view, the evidence favors the 10% hypothesis. However, Dembski would point out that the 10% hypothesis predicted that most of the balls in your sample would fail to be green. Your observation contradicts this prediction. Are you therefore forced to reject the 10% hypothesis? If so, you are forced to reject the 1% hypothesis on the same grounds. But you know that one or the other hypothesis is true. Dembski's talk of a "probabilistic inconsistency" suggests that he thinks that improbable events can't really occur -- a true theory would never lead you to make probabilistic predictions that fail to come true." I must admit that I, on this particular point, find FS&S's reasoning to be a little strained. First, I think that everyone agrees that, say, a human being being assembled by random atoms banging together as a chance hypothesis is *far* too improbable, and that another explanation for the existence of humans is required. Pointing out that we sometimes must accept hypotheses requiring low probabilities doesn't justify accepting hypotheses requiring *extremely* low probabilities. Second, the example proposed above is only valid if we are absolutely sure that the mentioned buckets are the only possible sources. Given the above event, I would consider the possibility that someone was pulling my leg, and that the balls really came from a bucket, where 70% of the balls were green. 6) Since the explanatory filter requires you to reject *all* chance hypotheses before accepting design, infering design is nigh-impossible, unless you happen to be omniscient: "Here Dembski is *much* too hard on Design. Paley reasonably concluded that the watch he found is better explained by postulating a watchmaker than by the hypothesis of random physical processes. This conclusion makes sense even if Paley admits his lack of omniscience about possible Chance hypotheses, but it does not make sense according to the Filter. What Paley did was compare a specific chance hypothesis and a specific design hypothesis without pretending that he thereby surveyed all possible chance hypotheses. For this reason as well as for others we have mentioned, friends of Design should shun the Filter, not embrace it." (emphasis original) 7) Since it is impossible to eliminate all competing theories, ID-theory can't establish itself merely by eliminating Neo-Darwinistic evolution. Instead, it must be able to make predictions that can be tested: "To test evolutionary theory against the hypothesis of intelligent design, you must know what both hypotheses predict about observables (Fitelson and Sober 1998, Sober 1999b). The searchlight therefore must be focused on the design hypothesis itself. What does it predict? If defenders of the design hypothesis want their theory to be scientific, they need to do the scientific work of formulating and testing the predictions that creationism makes (Kitcher 1984, Pennock 1999). Dembski's Explanatory Filter encourages creationists to think that this responsibility can be evaded. However, the fact of the matter is that the responsibility must be faced." It will be interesting to see if Dembski in fact *has* succeeded in "consider[ing] the main criticisms of specified complexity". WAD> Consequently, specified complexity is not just WAD> one of several ways for reinstating design in the WAD> natural sciences-it is the only way. There is no need to "reinstat[e] design in the natural sciences": Several natural sciences, like archaeology and anthropology, have already been detecting and studying intelligent designed objects for decades. Perhaps some of the archaeologists on this list (Brian? Anne?) would like to comment on whether they need Dembski's filter to infer that, say, a cave painting is designed? WAD> Specified complexity, as I explicate it in The WAD> Design Inference, belongs to statistical decision WAD> theory. Statistical decision theory attempts to WAD> set the ground rules for how to draw inferences WAD> for occurrences governed by probabilities. Now, WAD> statistical decision theorists have their own WAD> internal disputes about the proper definition of WAD> probability and the proper logic for drawing WAD> probabilistic inferences. It was therefore WAD> unavoidable that specified complexity should come WAD> in for certain technical criticisms simply WAD> because the field of statistical decision theory WAD> is itself so factionalized (cf. Bayesian vs. WAD> frequentist approaches to probability). Dembski is ignoring that most of "the main criticisms of specified complexity" didn't deal with the probability-part of his book, but with the philosophical and logical assumptions, as well as his inability to clearly define his terms. For Dembski to claim that "the main criticisms of specified complexity" are mostly due to the fact that "the field of statistical decision theory is itself so factionalized", is simply misleading. WAD> The approach I take follows the common WAD> statistical practice (popularized by Ronald WAD> Fisher) of rejecting a chance hypothesis if a WAD> sample appears in a prespecified rejection WAD> region. What my complexity-specification WAD> criterion does is extend this statistical WAD> practice in two ways: First, it generalizes the WAD> types of rejections regions by which chance is WAD> eliminated, namely, to what I call WAD> "specifications." Another example of Dembski obfuscating the issue by using vague and impressive-sounding terms to describe even the most simple concepts. Statistical theory is operating with what is known as "rejection regions". For example, before taking a statistical sample of the number of people who have been cured of cancer after taking drug X, the statistican might decide that if the result differs from that expected by pure luck by 0.01 or less, the usefulness of drug X in curing cancer should be rejected. Dembski's "inovation" is to claim that this "rejection region" can be formulated *after* the sample has been taken, in which case it should be called a "specification". So when Dembski says that his "complexity-specification criterion" "generalizes the types of rejections regions by which chance is eliminated ... to ... specifications", he is just saying that it can also eliminate chance *after* the event is known. This is the claim that many reviewers have objected to, and which FS&S's review spends considerable time questioning. WAD> Second, it allows for the elimination of all WAD> relevant chance hypotheses for an eve


Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/004.html ID-Commentary: "Disbelieving Darwin -- And Feeling No Shame!" From: Morgan Grey < cynical_prophet@yahoo.com > To: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Reply-to: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Date: Fri Oct 12, 2001 9:54 am Message: 21889 Subject: ID-Commentary: "Disbelieving Darwin..." This is my fourth commentary on texts written by leading IDers. My last such post can be found at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/003.html >. This week, I'm commenting on Dembski's "Disbelieving Darwin -- And Feeling No Shame!", posted to Metanexus at < http://www.meta-list.org/archives/fulldetails.asp?listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=2581 > (also online at < http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/2581.html >) In this article, Dembski speculates about dogmatism in science, the public's alleged refusal to accept Darwinism, and also shares a few thoughts about evangical Christianity's new poster-child, Intelligent Design-Theory. ------------------------------------------------------- 027: Disbelieving Darwin and Feeling No Shame, by William Dembski Metaviews 027. 2000.03.16. Approximately 2150 words. BG> Below is a column from William Dembski from the BG> Polanyi Center at Baylor University with the BG> title "Disbelieving Darwin - And Feeling No BG> Shame!" Dembski makes a compelling inductive BG> argument from past scientific failures that we BG> should be skeptical about Darwinism. He presents BG> the dominant biological orthodoxy as dogmatic and BG> out of step with the public and the evidence. BG> Dembski develops a tentative case for moving BG> beyond Darwinism. BG> BG> In the end, Dembski presents Intelligent Design BG> Theory as THE alternative to Darwinism, but there BG> are other possibilities to be considered. I would BG> also like to see the terms "intelligent" BG> and "design" defined in a rigorous manner. BG> Finally, one wonders whether the radical BG> skepticism that Dembski advocates for science BG> would also be applied to his religious beliefs and BG> how. All in all though, we have a poignant BG> counterpoint to Michael Shermer's recent thread. BG> BG> -- Billy Grassie BG> WAD> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- From: WAD> William_Dembski@baylor.edu (William A. Dembski) WAD> Subject: Disbelieving Darwin -- And Feeling No WAD> Shame! Dembski starts out by praising the tentativeness of science and warning us of letting dogmatism replace commitment to a certain theory. All well and good, and hopefully something that scientists on both sides of the issue can agree with. And since everyone can read this for themselves in the original document, I have snipped the beginning of Dembski's essay without further comment. [...] WAD> I open with these general remarks about WAD> tentativeness and dogmatism in science because WAD> their importance is too frequently neglected in WAD> discussions of biological evolution. It hardly WAD> makes for a free and open exchange of ideas when WAD> biologist Richard Dawkins asserts, "It is WAD> absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody WAD> who claims not to believe in evolution, that WAD> person is ignorant, stupid, or insane (or wicked, WAD> but I'd rather not consider that)." Nor does WAD> philosopher Michael Ruse help matters when he WAD> trumpets, "Evolution is a fact, *fact*, *FACT!*" WAD> WAD> Nor for that matter does Stephen Jay Gould's WAD> protegÇ Michael Shermer promote insight into WAD> natural selection when he announces, "No one, and WAD> I mean *no one*, working in the field is debating WAD> whether natural selection is the driving force WAD> behind evolution, much less whether evolution WAD> happened or not." Let me be entirely clear on this: Dembski has a point. In presenting the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution to the public, many scientists *have* (and still do) presented evolution dogmatically and without the tentativeness that Dembski advocates (and with which I absolutely agree). However, I also believe that this rests as much on YEC's as on evolutionary biologists. In their oft-repeated claims that "evolution is just a theory", they have forced the scientific community to make clear that common descent (and to a certain degree the process of evolution) is supported by overwhelming evidence. In doing so, many scientists have emphasized the evidential suppport of the theory to the point of presenting it as something that simply *cannot* be false. Needless to say, members of the ID movement have seized on these statements, pressing the opposite point: That the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, as the only scientific theory, is being presented as something *other* than "a theory". Let me add that not all scientists have fallen to the temptation of presenting the theory as something it is not, as these few examples will hopefully show: "It would be folly for evolutionists to claim that they have a complete and accurate understanding of the history of life and of the processes that produced that history. Too many major paradigms in science have been overturned for any statement of such absolute confidence to be wise. We should consider alternatives and we should consider the possibility that we might be wrong in at least some parts of the basic framework of evolutionary thinking. And this consideration of alternatives is, in fact, going on in the 1980s with challenges from within evolutionary biology itself to the neo-Darwinian model as it is applied to macroevolution (Lewin 1980)." (Raup, D.M., "The Geological and Paleontological Arguments of Creationism", in Godfrey, L.R. (ed.), 1983, "Scientists Confront Creationism", pp. 161) "Science does not claim to discover the final truth but only to put forward hypotheses based on evidence that is available at the time of their presentation. Well-corroborated hypotheses are often treated as facts, and such a fact is that of organic evolution. If a hypthesis is fairly general in its presentation, it is difficult to test, but a detailed hypothesis like that of organic evolution is readily suspectible to disproof. The evidence for evolution is overwhelming, and there is no known fact that either weakens the hypothesis or disproves it." (Campbell, B.G., 1966, "Human Evolution", pp. 1) WAD> Such remarks, and especially the attitude behind WAD> them, do nothing to settle the ongoing WAD> controversy over evolution. Gallup polls WAD> consistently indicate that only about ten percent WAD> of the U.S. population accepts the sort of WAD> evolution advocated by Dawkins, Ruse, and WAD> Shermer, that is, evolution in which the driving WAD> force is the Darwinian selection mechanism. The WAD> rest of the population is committed to some form WAD> of intelligent design. Dembski is doing some serious word-spinning here. Gallup's poll doesn't even use the term "Darwinian selection mechanism", so any claims of the "population accept[ing]" "evolution in which [this is] the driving force" must come from Dembski, not from Gallup. According to < http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010305.asp >, the poll asks people to chose the following statement that best describes their view: "Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God guided this process." "Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process." "God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so." Of the people asked, 37% agreed with the first statement, 12% with the second, and 45% with the third. Since statement no. 2 is tantamount to atheism, it is not at all surprising that only a small minority of the American public agrees with it. In fact, only 1% of the people referring to themselves as "creationists" agreed with this statement. And that the 45% agreeing with statement 3 "is committed to some form of intelligent design" is also well beyond dispute, given that they are most likely YECs. However, when Dembski choses to classify the 37% who agreed with the first statement as being "committed to some form of intelligent design", he is simply imposing *his own* opinion about how "God guided this process", in order to make it appear as if the public somehow supports the ID-movement. For example, all Christians who hold some version of theistic evolution, teleological evolution, or fully gifted creation would hardly like being told that they are "committed to some form of intelligent design", especially after Dembski told them that "intelligent design is incompatible" with their position, and that it "[t]heistic evolution takes the Darwinian picture of the biological world and baptizes it" ("Intelligent Design", pp. 110). And as far as Gallup is concerned, those 45% "selected a statement that can be seen as compatible with the scientific findings of evolutionary scholars". There is absolutely no evidence that the public is particularly committed to the views espoused by members of the ID-movement. In fact, Alan G. Padgett, writing for Christianity Today, a magazine that characterizes itself as believing that "the Scriptures are the inspired Word of God and that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation", does "not think that the intelligent-design folks will win the day", and even "accept[s] the notion that life will some day be explained through natural causes": "For my part, if I had to predict today how a future Angelic Doctor will reconcile theology and science, I would throw my hat in with O'Hear and Swinburne. I do not believe the intelligent-design folks will win the day. In other words, I accept the notion that life will some day be explained through natural causes, while insisting that God is the origin of all natural things, natural causes, and natural laws. In this way design and evolution are not opposites. Rather, evolution is based upon natural regularities, which in turn are created by God. Evolution is based upon design." (Padgett, A.G., 2000, "Creation by Design", Christianity Today, < http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2000/004/13.30.html >) I am not claiming that the public is particularly hostile to the ID-movement, or that the majority holds those versions of theistic evolution that are compatible with neo-Darwinism, since the options presented by the Gallup-poll are so vague. However, I strongly resent Dembski's attempt to twist those results in order to claim that the majority of the population "is committed to some form of intelligent design." I have hear snipped several paragraphs, in which Dembski advances speculations about "why the public rejects Darwinism". I found these speculations irrelevant until Dembski can *show* that "the public rejects Darwinism", and have therefore not commented on them. [...] WAD> The public need feel no shame at disbelieving and WAD> openly criticizing Darwinism. Most scientific WAD> theories these days are initially published in WAD> specialized journals or monographs, and are WAD> directed toward experts assumed to possess WAD> considerable technical background. Not so WAD> Darwin's theory. The locus classicus for Darwin's WAD> theory remains his *Origin of Species*. In it WAD> Darwin took his case to the public. Dembski is here "forgetting" the fact that in Darwin's time, there was few to none scientific publications dealing with biology, in which Darwin could have published his theory. In fact, Darwin practically *founded* biology as a science, eventually making possible the publication of biological journals like NATURE and SCIENCE, in which studies regarding evolution are published. WAD> Contemporary Darwinists likewise continue to take WAD> their case to the public. There is nothing wrong in "tak[ing one's] case to the public." What is usually advocated is that one *also* "take[s one's] case to the" scientific community. So far, the ID-community has not published anything in the scientific litterature, offering any evidence for their claims that certain things (the universe, life, etc.) is intelligently caused. Perhaps Dembski, in his next writing, will assure the public that it "need feel no shame at disbelieving and openly criticizing" Intelligent Design-theory? WAD> The books of Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, WAD> Stephen Jay Gould, E. O. Wilson, and a host of WAD> other biologists and philosophers aim to convince WAD> a skeptical public about the merits of Darwin's WAD> theory. These same authors commend the public WAD> when it finds their arguments convincing. But WAD> when the public remains unconvinced, commendation WAD> turns to condemnation. WAD> Daniel Dennett even recommends "quarantining" WAD> parents who teach their children to doubt WAD> Darwinism (see the end of his *Darwin's Dangerous WAD> Idea*). In his "Intelligent Design" (pp. 289) Dembski makes the same charge, specifying the reference to page 519 in Dennett's book. I assume that Dembski is referring to the following paragraph: "We should not expect this variety of respect to be satisfactory to those who wholeheartedly embody the memes [fundamentalist Christianity] we honor with our attentive -but not worshipful- scholarship. On the contrary, many of them will view anything other than enthusiastic conversion to their own view as a threat, even an intolerable threat. ... But we have no reasonable alternative, and those whose visions dictate that they cannot peacefully coexist with the rest of us we will have to quarantine as best we can, minimizing the pain and damage, trying always to leave open a path or two that may come to be seen as acceptable." (Dennet, D.C., 1995, "Darwin's Dangerous Idea", pp. 519) Unless Dembski thinks that "teach[ing one's] children to doubt Darwinism" "dictate that [one] cannot peacefully coexist with" other people, it seems as if we have another example of Dembski misrepresenting his opponents' views. [...] WAD> Whether intelligent design is the theory that WAD> ultimately overturns Darwinism is not the issue. WAD> The issue is whether the scientific community is WAD> willing to eschew dogmatism and admit as a live WAD> possibility that even its most cherished views WAD> might be wrong. This is, IMHO, a *non*issue. Dogmatig-sounding statements from popularizers of science notwithstanding, there is absolutely no reason for assuming that "the scientific community is" *not* "willing to eschew dogmatism and admit as a live possibility that even its most cherished views might be wrong." [...] WAD> William Dembski WAD> META> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Footer META> information below last updated: 1999/12/10. [...] META> Copyright 1999, 2000 by William Grassie. Copies META> of this internet posting may be made and META> distributed in whole without further permission. META> Credit: "This information was circulated on the META> Meta Lists on Science and Religion META> < http://www.meta-list.org >." ------------------------------------------------------- ===== Morgan "Evolution is to the social sciences as statues are to birds: a convenient platform upon which to deposit badly digested ideas." (Steve Jones, 2000, "Darwin's Ghost", pp. xxvii) [ More ID-Commentaries ]


ID-Commentary: "Who's Got the Magic?"

Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/005.html ID-Commentary: "Who's Got the Magic?" From: Morgan Grey < cynical_prophet@yahoo.com > To: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Reply-to: < DebunkCreation@yahoogroups.com > Date: Sun Oct 21, 2001 5:44 pm Message: 22008 Subject: ID-Commentary: "Who's Got the Magic?" Group, This is my fifth commentary on texts written by leading IDers. My last such post can be found at http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/004.html . This week, I'm commenting on Dembski's "Who's Got the Magic?", posted to Metanexus at http://www.meta-list.org/archives/fulldetails.asp?listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=2595 (also online at http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/2595.html ). Dembski's post is a response to Pennock's criticism of Johnson's "supernatural theistic science", as found in Pennock's "Tower of Babel". Following that is a criticism of what Dembski sees as "bargain-hunting", where "scientific naturalists" are trying to get "something for nothing". Pennock has written a reply, which can be found at http://www.meta-list.org/archives/fulldetails.asp?listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=2645 . Although quite long, it raises some good criticism of Dembski's essay, and should be read by everybody interested in the issue (if only for the fun of being able to say "hare designer" out loud). ------------------------------------------------------- 042: Who's Got the Magic? by William Dembski Metaviews 042. 2000.04.25. Approximately 2286 words. BG> In the posting below, William Dembski from the BG> Michael Polanyi Center at Baylor University offers BG> a critical review of Robert Pennock's book "The BG> Tower of Babel." In so doing, he argues again on BG> behalf on "Intelligent Design Theory," which he BG> distinguishes from "Creationism." In my view, the BG> debate would be improved, if both terms were more BG> carefully defined, rather than assumed. BG> BG> In any case, Dembski argues that the "something BG> for nothing" thinking which characterizes BG> scientific materialism approach to evolution is BG> akin to "magic". "Pennock and his fellow BG> scientific naturalists," writes Dembski, "are BG> bargain hunters" (i.e. looking for something for BG> nothing.) "They want to explain the appearance of BG> design in nature without admitting actual design." BG> BG> Dembski and the Polanyi Center have been in the BG> news recently with 1) a very ambitious conference BG> on Naturalism in Science held two weeks ago BG> involving a broad spectrum of thinkers, and 2) a BG> recent vote by the faculty senate at Baylor BG> University seeking to close the one-year old BG> center (see the Chronicle of Higher Education on BG> 4/19/00). BG> BG> I am grateful that these debates can also take BG> place on Meta and welcome your comments and BG> feedback. BG> BG> -- Billy Grassie BG> WAD> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= From: WAD> William_Dembski@baylor.edu (William A. Dembski) WAD> Subject: Who's Got the Magic? WAD> WAD> In criticizing Phillip Johnson's "intelligent WAD> design creationism," Robert Pennock raises a WAD> particularly worrisome legal consequence of WAD> Johnson's view. According to Pennock, Johnson WAD> insists "that science admit the reality of WAD> supernatural influences in the daily workings of WAD> the world." But what if the same reasoning that WAD> Johnson is trying to import into science were WAD> adopted in Johnson's own area of specialization WAD> -- the law (Johnson is a law professor at UC WAD> Berkeley)? Here's the concern as Pennock lays it WAD> out in _Tower of Babel_ (p. 295): WAD> WAD> [[indent]] "For the law to take [Johnson's view] WAD> seriously as well, it would have to be open to WAD> both suits and defenses based on a range of WAD> possible divine and occult interventions. Imagine WAD> the problems that would result if the courts had WAD> to accept legal theories of this sort. How would WAD> the court rule on whether to commit a purportedly WAD> insane person to a mental hospital for self- WAD> mutilation who claims that the Lord told her to WAD> pluck out her eye because it offended her? How WAD> would a judge deal with a defendant, Abe, accused WAD> of attempted murder of his son, Ike, who claims WAD> that he was only following God's command that he WAD> kill Ike to prove his faith?" WAD> WAD> Implicit in this passage and throughout Pennock's WAD> book is a forced choice between mechanism and WAD> magic: Either the world works by mechanisms that WAD> obey inviolable natural laws and that admit no WAD> break in the chain of natural causation, or all WAD> hell breaks loose and the world admits WAD> supernatural interventions that make a hash of WAD> science and our understanding of the world WAD> generally (and legal studies in particular). This is not "[i]mplicit" at all. Pennock is in fact quite forthcoming about the reality of this "forced choice": "Without the binding assumption of uninterruptible natural law there would be absolute chaos in the scientific worldview. Supernatural explanations undermine the discipline that allows science to make progress. It is not that supernatural agents and powers could not explain in principle, it is rather that they can explain all too easily." (Pennock, R.T., 2000, "Tower of Babel", pp. 294) What might come as a surprise, I partially disagree with Pennock on this point. When Pennock says that "[s]upernatural explanations undermine [science]", he is supposing that the there is such a thing as a "natural explanation". However, I have often found that since this term has been used by so many authors in so many contexts, its meaning has been diluted to the point of being useless in any discussion about the philosophy of science. Many IDists (most notably, Johnson) have taken advantage of this fact, claiming that since "science only considers naturalistic explanations", any form of intelligent design is excluded from considerations a priori, when no such thing is (or should be) the case. Even a wide definition of "natural" like "consisting of a form of matter and/or energy" is too limiting, since we have no way of knowing if explanations involving other substances will one day be feasible. In the place of "naturalistic", I offer "knowable". Although not all scientific explanations should necessarily use known mechanisms (dark matter being a substance about which we know very little), they should all use explanations, in which the mechanisms are *knowable*. The reason I only "partially" disagree with Pennock, is that for all intents and purposes, "*super*natural" equals "*un*knowable". Putting aside fortune tellers and mediums, all claiming to "know the mind of God", everyone agrees that any knowledge about the supernatural is impossible, even in principle. As Pennock writes: "God works, as they say, in mysterious ways. We cannot have any privy knowledge of God's will, and those who have tried to claim it are quickly brought back to earth. When the complex Ptolemaic epicycle theory of the planetary system was explained to Alphonso X, King of Castile, with its equant points, eccentrics, deferents, and epicycles -wheels upon wheels within offset wheels- he is reported to have commented that "if God had consulted him at the creation, the universe should have been on a better and simpler plan." Defending the complexity of his theoretical models from another critic who made the same point, Ptolemy is said to have replied, "You may complain that these models are not simple, but from the point of view of God, who knows what is simple?" And, of course, Ptolemy was right; we cannot say that our notion of simplicity is at all relevant to what God's might be, or even if God values simplicity at all. Scientific models must be judged on natural grounds of evidence, for we have no supernatural ground upon which we can stand since any such ground is necessarily a mystery to us." (Pennock, 2000, pp. 290) WAD> Pennock is offering his readers mechanism. WAD> Johnson is offering them magic. Any reasonable WAD> person knows which option to choose. WAD> WAD> But as with most forced choices, there's a WAD> tertium quid that Pennock has conveniently WAD> ignored, and that when properly understood shows WAD> that the real magician here is in fact Pennock WAD> and not Johnson. The tertium quid here is WAD> intelligent design, which is entirely separable WAD> from creationism. But Pennock, as a trained WAD> philosopher, knows that design is an old notion WAD> that requires neither miracles nor a creator (F. WAD> H. Sandbach's _The Stoics_, for instance, makes WAD> this abundantly clear). That "intelligent design" is a "tertium quid" is quite correct! And, in this case, also a straw man erected by Dembski. Pennock never claimed that the by Dembski quoted argument was directed at some generic version of "intelligent design"; in "Toder of Babel", he clearly identifies it as being among "Prospects for a Supernatural "Theistic Science"" (the *heading* of the paragraph in question). If Dembski doesn't consider "intelligent design" to be identical to Johnson's "theistic science", he should not set up Pennock's criticism of the latter as a criticism of the former, but instead openly acknowledge the difference. However, there is much evidence that Dembski *doesn't* think that there is such a difference: "Intelligent design is three things: a scientific research program that investigates the effects of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of understanding divine action. Intelligent design therefore intersects science and theology." (Dembski, W.A., 1999, "Intelligent Design", pp. 13) "The crucial breakthrough of the intelligent design movement has been to show that this great theological truth -that God acts in the world by dispersing information- also has scientific content." (Dembski, 1999, pp. 233) For the sake of the argument, I have no trouble accepting that inferences to design does not need to involve supernatural or unknown agency (in fact, I often find myself having to remind IDists that archaeologists have been detecting intelligent design for ages without Dembski's filter, and that his attempt to "reinstate design within science" is completely unnecessary). However, since the leading members of the ID-movement often seems to "forget" that the alleged designer need not be God (especially when talking to their supporter[s]), I feel perfectly justified in pointing out this inconcistency. WAD> Intelligent design is detectable; we do in fact WAD> detect it; we have reliable methods for detecting WAD> it (cf. my _The Design Inference_); and its WAD> detection involves no recourse to the WAD> supernatural. Design is common, rational, and WAD> objectifiable. Dembski is here falling into what Lamoureux calls "the problem of conflation of ideas" (although in a situation involving conflation of other ideas): "A significant factor in the acceptance of Johnson's "Darwin on Trial" (1991) and "Reason in the Balance" (1995) in the North American evangical community relates directly to the way he presents his arguments. His three foundational principles are so tightly interwoven throughout his writings that it becomes nearly impossible for the reader to distinguish them, and this opens the door for the problem of the conflation of ideas. When this happens a poorly rationalized idea can be "justified" simply by being placed alongside a powerful truth. ... This phenomenon of the conflation of ideas is operating in Johnson's writings with regard to his three foundational principles. As I affirmed earlier, with qualification, Johnson's first two principles are powerful and clearly welcomed by all Christians: (1) an attack against naturalism and materialism, (2) support for intelligent design in the universe. However, I caution readers not to conflate these two powerful ideas with Johnson's third foundational principle -the complete failure of the modern theory of biological evolution." (Lamoureux, "Evangicals Inheriting the Wind: The Phillip E. Johnson Phenomenon", in Johnson, P.E. & Lamoureux, D.O. et al., 1999, "Darwinism Defeated?", pp. 25, 26) In Dembski's case, it is the conflation of the reality of detection of design and Dembski's "explanatory filter" as a reliable design-detector. It doesn't follow from the fact that we can detect design that Dembski's filter is the most reliable way to do this. In fact, as I argued in my third ID-Commentary, two weeks ago, in most of the cases were we detect intelligent agency, we do so on the basis of the explanatory power in asuming that the object in question was brought about by a specific intelligent agent. E-mails, watches, and the Rosetta stone are all instances where we use our knowledge about specific designers to explain why, say, the three texts, written in three languages on the Rosetta stone all mean the same when translated, or why the symbols on the face of a watch all resemble Arabic nummerals. Even Dembski, when discussing his favorite example of design-detection, the Caputo case, uses knowledge about the designer (Nicholas Caputo) in constructing the pattern needed for his explanatory filter: "Now consider a human subject S confronted with sequences (A) and (B). S comes to the these sequences with considerable background knowledge which, we may suppose, includes the following: (1) Nicholas Caputo is a Democrat. (2) Nicholas Caputo would like to see the Democrats appear first on the ballot since having the first place on the ballot line significantly boosts one's chances of winning an election. (3) Nicholas Caputo, as election commissioner of Essex County, has full control over who appears first on the ballots in Essex County. (4) Election commissioners in the past have been guilty of all manner of fraud, including unfair assignments of ballot lines. (5) If Captuto were assigning ballot lines fairly, then both Democrats and Republicans should recieve priority roughly the same number of times. Given the background knowledge S is in a position to formulate various "cheating patterns" by which Caputo migh attempt to give the Democrats first place on the ballot." (Dembski, W.A., 1998, "The Design Inference", pp. 16) But no such things is possible when dealing with the unknown designer of the ID-movement. Not only because the designer is unknown, but also since much suggests that it is *unkowable*. As Dembski tells us, "[w]e cannot predict what an inventor would do short of becoming that inventor." (Dembski, 2001, "Is Intelligent Design Testable?", http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_isidtestable.htm ) And this is exactly the point of Pennock's criticism: "The appeal to supernatural forces, whether these are taken to be divine or occult, is always available for we can cite no necessary constraints upon the powers of supernatural agents. This is just the picture of God that Johnson presents. He says that God could create out of nothing or use evolution if He wanted; God is "omnipotent." He says God creates in the "furtherance of a purpose," but that God's purposes are "inscrutable" and "mysterious." A god that is all-powerful and whose will is inscrutable can be called to "explain" *any* event in any situation, and this is one reason for science's methodological prohibition against such appeals. Given this feature, supernatural hypotheses remain immune from disconformation." (Pennock, 2000, pp. 291-2, original emphasis) WAD> How, then, is Pennock a magician? There are at WAD> least three forms of magic. One is the art of WAD> illusion, where appearance is carefully crafted WAD> to distort reality. As entertainment, this form WAD> of magic is entirely unobjectionable. Another WAD> form of magic is to invoke the supernatural to WAD> explain a physical event. To call this magic is WAD> certainly a recent invention, since it makes most WAD> theists into magicians (Was Thomas Aquinas a WAD> magician for accepting as a historical fact the WAD> resurrection of Jesus? Was Moses Maimonides a WAD> magician for thinking that his namesake had WAD> parted the Red Sea?). Dembski, knowing that he can't contest Pennock's argument against the explanatory power of using supernatural explanations in science, instead starts Appealing to the Gallery (see http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/logic.html#populum ). And since about 90% of the population in USA are Christians, Dembski will get plenty of support if he can convince his audience that accepting Pennock's argument means that they are inconcistent Christians (curriously absent from Dembski's essay is the mention that Pennock himself is a Quaker). But the validity of an idea has nothing to do with whether we like the consequences or not. All that matters if it is *true*. However, I shall argue that Dembski is wrong in claiming that Pennock's argument "makes most theists into magicians", and that Christians in fact have no problem accepting a science using knowable explanations as well as the historical reality of miracles. We must recognize that there is a profound difference between believing in the historic reality of an event and believing that science can explain it. A distinction Dembski blurs when he equates Aquinas' and Maimonides' beliefs in miracles with his own claim that they believed that those events could be scientifically explained by invoking the supernatural. It might very well be the case that a man named Jesus was resurrected, almost two thousand years ago, or that the Red Sea parted to let Moses and the Jews pass, even longer before. A scientist observing those things happening would have no reason to deny the reality of those things. And even if they had not been observed, their historical reality could be inferred from the traces those events had left, as witnessed by YEC flood geologists trying to find evidence for a supernaturally caused Flood in sediments and "polystrate" fossils. But, for the reasons outlined above, science would not be able to show that these events was caused by a supernatural entity with an "inscrutable" purpose, since such a claim is necessarily untestable. People believing that this really *was* the case, should find support for this elsewhere (theology or philosophy). WAD> According to Pennock, intelligent design WAD> creationism is guilty of this form of magic. Deep WAD> down, though, Pennock must realize that WAD> intelligent design (leaving off the creationism) WAD> can avoid this charge. It is not a coincidence that it is said of Intelligent Design that it "says one thing one day, and then seems to say a different thing the next." ( http://www.meta-list.org/archives/fulldetails.asp?listtype=Magazine&ARCHIVEID=3512 ) As per the quote above, Dembski has been claiming that ID has shown "that this great theological truth -that God acts in the world by dispersing information- also has scientific content", yet now he is saying that his theory need *not* invoke the supernatural. Again, I have no problem with intelligent design not supporting any theologic claims, but I would wish that leaders of the ID-movement themselves would be more forthwright about the things they think ID actually *is*. WAD> Pennock is guilty of his own form of magic, WAD> however. The third form of magic, and the one WAD> Pennock and his fellow scientific naturalists are WAD> guilty of, is the view that something can be WAD> gotten for nothing. Of course, whether or not something is "from nothing" is absolutely irrelevant. All that matters is if it is *true*. In determining this, it might be useful if Dembski could bring himself to comment on the evidence that has been presented to him as disproofs of ID-claims about the capability of evolutionary algorithm in solving difficult problems, such as the answer to the 500 city Traveling Salesman Problem, presented by Wesley Elsberry in http://www.geocities.com/evolutionsteori/IDC/5f5blk.html . [...] WAD> Even so, the scientific community continues to be WAD> skeptical of d


Dembski's Agency Triad

Legacy route: /people/mgrey/IDC/199811261107.html Dembski's Agency Triad From: "Wesley R. Elsberry" < wre@cx33978-a.dt1.sdca.home.com > Newsgroups: talk.origins Date: 1998/11/26 Message-ID: <199811261107.DAA21334@CX33978-A.DT1.SDCA.HOME.COM>#1/1 Subject: Dembski's Agency Triad [Quote] The actualization of one among several competing possibilities, the exclusion of the rest, and the specification of the possibility that was actualized encapsulate how we recognize intelligent agents. Actualization-Exclusion-Specification - this triad - provides a general scheme for recognizing intelligence, be it animal, human, or extraterrestrial. Actualization establishes that the possibility in question is the one that actually occurred. Exclusion establishes that there was genuine contingency (i.e., that there were other live possibilities, and that these were ruled out). Specification establishes that the actualized possibility conforms to a pattern given independently of its actualization. Now where does choice, that defining characteristic of intelligent agency, figure into this criterion? The problem is that we never witness choice directly. Instead, we witness actualizations of contingency that might be the result of choice (i.e., directed contingency), but that also might be the result of chance (i.e., blind contingency). Now there is only one way to tell the difference - specification. Specification is the only means available to us for distinguishing choice from chance, directed contingency from blind contingency. Actualization and exclusion together guarantee that we are dealing with contingency. Specification guarantees we are dealing with a directed contingency. The Actualization-Exclusion-Specification triad is therefore precisely what we need to identify choice and therewith intelligent agency. [End Quote - WA Dembski, TDI, pp.63-64] Dembski has either shown in the above that natural selection is intelligent, or that there is no conceivable test that will distinguish the action of natural selection from the action of an intelligent agent. That is, the process of natural selection fits the triad listed. Actualization - heritable variation arises. Exclusion - some heritable variations lead to differential reproductive success, so that some heritable variation increases in representation and other heritable variation decreases in representation in the population. Specification - environmental conditions specify which variations are preferred, and thus yields directed contingency. -- Wesley R. Elsberry, Student in Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences, Tx A&M U. Visit the Online Zoologists page ( http://www.rtis.com/nat/user/elsberry ) Email to this account is dumped to /dev/null, whose Spam appetite is capacious. "All our times have come\Here but now they're done" - BOC